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A STATE PROSECUTOR LOOKS AT THE JENCKS CASE 
THOMAS F. EAGLETON 
About half a year has passed since the Supreme Court of the United States 
handed down its highly-publicized decision in Jencks v. United States1  on the 
first Monday of June.  During that time newspaper editorialists, syndicated 
columnists and magazine writers have sat in judgment on the case.  In general, 
they have excoriated the Supreme Court for its decision and raised ominous 
warnings that the security, and indeed even the survival of our nation, is at 
stake.2 
The initial hysteria which foamed in the wake of the decision may be 
subsiding.  The Congress has thrashed out the matter and passed a new law to 
clarify the decision.3  Time, that proverbial healer, is gradually offering the 
opportunity for calm dispassionate analysis. 
The purpose of this article is to point out soberly what the decision holds 
and then to analyze its possible applications to criminal prosecutions in the 
state courts. 
The Holding in the Jencks Case 
Clinton E. Jencks was president of a member local of the International 
Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers.  In conformity with the provisions of 
the Taft-Hartley Act, he filed an affidavit of non-communism.  An indictment 
followed, charging Jencks with perjury in swearing that he was not a member 
or affiliate of the Communist party at the time of the affidavit. 
The case for the government was based on circumstantial evidence.  Two 
principal witnesses were produced to show that Jencks was a member of the 
party during the affidavit period.  Both witnesses were Communist party 
members paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to make reports of party 
 
 Originally published at 4 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 405 (1956–1957). 
 Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis, Mo. A.B., Amherst; LL.B., Harvard. 
 1. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
 2. A sample of some evaluations: “Open the files of every police department in the country 
to every shyster lawyer who works for a hood and we might as well hand law-enforcement over 
the Lucky Luciano and let him run the show.”  George E. Sokolsky in syndicated column, June 
13, 1957.  “The Court’s ruling has made the Federal machinery of Justice virtually grind to a 
halt.”  St. Louis Globe-Democrat, editorial page, July 19, 1957. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957). 
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activities in which they participated.  One, J.W. Ford, in addition to describing 
five party meetings prior to the affidavit where Jencks was present, stated that 
as a security officer in the party he was not aware that any discipline had been 
taken against Jencks up to the time of the affidavit. 
Harvey F. Matusow was the other government witness in the employ of the 
FBI.  He testified that he had spent 10 days with Jencks a few months after the 
filing of the affidavit.  The effect of Matusow’s testimony was to show that 
Jencks was still active as a Communist. 
Matusow and Ford admitted on the stand that they had made 
contemporaneous reports to the FBI, both oral and written, about matters 
covered by their testimony. 
Defense counsel sought to have the court examine these previous 
statements and reports of the witnesses to see if they would have impeaching 
value.  The defense was not prepared to show that the previous statements 
given to the FBI contradicted anything that Matusow and Ford said at trial.  
The trial court denied this motion, and the ruling was affirmed by the court of 
appeals.4 
After the conviction of Jencks, Matusow recanted his trial testimony under 
oath at a hearing on a defense motion for a new trial.  When the government 
attacked his credibility at this rehearing, the defense again moved for 
production of the statements and reports, this time to rehabilitate Matusow by 
showing that the documents supported his recantation.  This motion was 
denied and the judge, apparently not believing the recantation, refused another 
trial.  Once again the court of appeals affirmed.5 
Granting a writ of certiorari,6  the Supreme Court confined itself to the 
issue raised by the at-trial motion for production.  Reversing the lower courts, 
it drew a broad rule to cover such situations.7  The Court, speaking through 
Justice Brennan, held that a defendant is entitled to look at relevant statements 
or reports given by witnesses to the government, “touching the subject matter 
 
 4. 226 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 5. 226 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 6. 350 U.S. 980 (1956). 
 7. As a “rule,” the Jencks holding is new.  But some lower federal courts prior to the 
decision had been granting disclosure of witnesses’ statements, either for judicial inspection to 
determine impeachment value or immediate production to defendant, without any showing of 
contradiction.  e.g., United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United 
States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1954).  Under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, one circuit has permitted pre-trial discovery of witnesses’ statements for 
possible impeachment.  Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 
U.S. 885 (1953).  There has been disagreement in this circuit whether this pre-trial disclosure is 
limited to capital cases where witnesses are endorsed prior to trial.  United States v. Carter, 15 
F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954); United States v. Bell, 126 F. Supp. 612 (D.D.C. 1955). 
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of their testimony at the trial.”8  Such documents include those “written, and, 
when orally made, as recorded by the FBI . . . .”9  The defense need show no 
contradiction between trial testimony and these reports.  Furthermore, the 
practice of having the trial judge look at the reports initially to determine 
relevancy and materiality is disapproved.  If the reports are shown to relate to 
the testimony of the witness, they are by that fact relevant and material for the 
purposes of production and inspection.  (The court’s traditional power to rule 
on materiality and relevancy of evidence for admissibility at the trial is still 
unimpaired.  While no longer having the discretion to refuse an order to 
produce the prior statements or reports to the defendant, the federal judge may 
still deny them admission if they are not acceptable evidence.) 
The manifest effort of the Supreme Court to state its rule in Jencks clearly 
and unequivocally has not eliminated disagreement over interpretation of the 
case.  Some of these interpretations raise questions which are, in my opinion, 
unreal; others raise substantial issues of the scope of the decision. 
A measure of the dispute over the meaning of Jencks can be gleaned from 
the relative haste with which Congress pushed through a bill to resolve the 
difficulties.  The statute which emerged from the conference committee in 
early September may well raise as many questions as it attempts to answer, but 
Congress apparently believed that fast action was necessary to protect the 
government from dismissal of criminal actions for failure to produce various 
parts of its files.  Utilizing both the case and the new statute, we can try to 
answer some of the questions which surround the entire controversy. 
Does a motion lie to produce witnesses’ statements prior to trail?  The 
answer would clearly seem to be in the negative.10  The Jencks opinion 
pinpoints the crucial issue as the need for impeachment by the defense.  The 
key phrase refers to relevant statements or reports “touching the subject 
matter” of the witnesses’ testimony at the trial.11  The court stresses the 
necessary essentials of a foundation for production: that the demand be for 
specific documents and not a demand for statements taken from persons not 
offered as witnesses.  Again, referring to the question whether conflict need be 
shown between trial testimony and the previous statement, the Court says: 
“The occasion for determining a conflict cannot arise until after the witness has 
testified . . . .”12  These statements emphatically preclude any right to 
 
 8. 353 U.S. at 672. 
 9. 353 U.S. at 668. 
 10. For the way in which pre-trial motions have been handled in the District of Columbia 
circuit under the Federal Rules relating to discovery and subpoena, see note 7 supra.  Other 
federal circuits have not permitted pre-trial disclosure of such documents under the rules.  See 
Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. Va. L. Rev. 221, 312 
(1956–57). 
 11. 353 U.S. at 672. 
 12. 353 U.S. at 667. 
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inspection before the trial.  But at least one federal district court has said that 
the Jencks rule entitles defendants to pre-trial disclosure.13  Notwithstanding 
such a holding, it seems to me that the more defensible interpretation of Jencks 
rests with the courts which have refused such motions.14 
Certainly there is no doubt that Congress interpreted the decision this way.  
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the managers for the House of 
Representatives in the conference committee which produced the final 
Congressional legislation issued a statement citing Judge George H. Moore of 
the eastern district of Missouri, and his application of the Jencks decision in 
the case of United States v. Anderson.15  Judge Moore’s interpretation, which 
was a standard for the conference committee as it framed the new statute, 
pointed out that the defendant would not be entitled to any statements or 
reports made by a person other than himself until that person has been called as 
a witness. 
The law which finally passed both houses of Congress provides in its first 
section that no statement or report given to an agent of the government shall be 
the subject of subpoena, discovery or inspection “until such witness has 
testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.”16  Presumably this does 
not mean that in a pre-trial conference in the interest of judicial expediency, 
the prosecution and the defense could not stipulate that any statements or 
reports will be handed over before trial.  But such an arrangement would come 
about only to save time and promote courtroom efficiency; it does not lie as a 
matter of right under the Supreme Court decision or the new statute. 
Under the Jencks rule, does a motion for disclosure apply to the entire FBI 
file in a given case?  Certainly not.  There is absolutely not one word in the 
majority opinion which indicates that the government must surrender its entire 
files.  Nevertheless, it was the precipitate action by some district courts in 
ordering disclosure of whole files, as detailed by Attorney General Brownell in 
a statement given to the House Committee on the Judiciary,17 which startled 
Congress into quick legislative action.  Other district courts have 
unequivocally rejected requests for the prosecution’s file.18  As mentioned 
 
 13. United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Ky. 1957).  The court declares that the 
language of the Jencks case “entirely dissipates any thought that the court must wait until the trial 
of the case and be actively engaged in the trial before the requirement to produce the documents 
can be made.” 
 14. United States v. Grossman, 26 U.S.L. Week 2060 (D.N.J. July 12, 1957); United States 
v. Benson, 25 U.S.L. Week 2603 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Anderson, (E.D. Mo. 1957). 
 15. The finding of fact and conclusion of law in this case, as yet unreported, is printed at 103 
Cong. Rec. 14552 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957). 
 17. Report of House Committee on the Judiciary, No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) p. 7. 
 18. Simms v. United States, 26 U.S.L. Week 2028 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 1957); United States v. 
Haug, 40 L.R.R.M. 2307 (N.D. Ohio 1957). 
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above, the Jencks decision itself is quite clear that the only matters which the 
federal government need turn over are statements taken from government 
witnesses who testify at the trial.  Statements taken from confidential 
informants who do not take the stand need not be turned over.19  Of course, 
once the federal government has offered a secret agent as a witness, his 
identity becomes immediately known and production of his relevant reports 
and statements could not be denied, under Jencks, merely on the grounds that 
the government has an interest in informants.  By the time he has finished 
testifying, his value as an “undercover” informant has evaporated. 
Running commentaries or summaries of the investigation made by FBI 
agents need not be produced.20  However, if the summary contains a quotation 
from the witness, a question arises as to whether this constitutes an “oral as 
recorded” statement mentioned by the Court.  Does the quotation have to be 
adopted by the potential witness, and if so, what type of adoption is necessary 
to bring it within the Jencks rule?  Congress has attempted to answer these 
questions by its definition of “statement” in section “e” of the statute.21 
Other aspects of the scope and application of the Jencks rule are also 
clouded.  What if the government has a statement given by a witness, only part 
of which “touches” his trial testimony in the opinion of the prosecution?  Who 
is to decide what “touches”?  If the judge is final arbitrator, does this mean that 
the entire file of the prosecution must be produced for his inspection?  How 
does the defendant contest a claim that all the designated documents have been 
produced? 
The congressional attempt to answer these questions has taken the 
following form in the statute:22 
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct 
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United 
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in 
the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to 
which the witness has testified.  If the entire contents of any such 
statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the 
 
 19. But in some instances the federal government is required to reveal the identity even 
though the informer is not used as a witness at the trial.  See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 
53 (1957), cited by the Jencks majority as in “accord” with its decision.  353 U.S. at 672. 
 20. If the agent is himself the witness, presumably these commentaries or summaries will be 
relevant for his impeachment. 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957); “(e) The term ‘statement’ . . . means (1) a written statement 
made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him, or (2) a stenographic, 
mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially 
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and 
recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement.” 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957). 
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court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his 
examination and use. 
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under 
this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of 
the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to 
deliver such statement for the inspection of the court in camera.  Upon 
such delivery the court shall excise the portions of such statement which 
do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness.  With 
such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such statement 
to the defendant for his use.  If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of 
such statement is withheld from the defendant and the defendant objects to 
such withholding, and the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt 
of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the 
United States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made 
available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining correctness 
of the ruling of the trial judge. 
It will doubtless take many months of exposure to the interpretations of 
trial and appellate judges until the full value of the new statute is determined.  
A major point of interest is the relationship between the new bill and the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  But for the state prosecutor, most of this 
development will have little immediate significance.  His point of concern will 
remain the case itself and the potential consequences in the states. 
Does Jencks Apply to State Prosecutions? 
The Jencks decision arose out of a federal criminal prosecution in a federal 
court.  The Supreme Court needed only to decide if error had been committed 
in the administration of federal criminal justice. 
On its face, then, the decision poses no special problem for the state 
prosecutor.  The court made no pronouncement on constitutional rights, nor did 
it in any way suggest that the formulated rule would apply to the states.  An 
analysis of the cases cited by the majority opinion would seem to show that the 
Jencks ruling rests on supervisory and administrative, and not constitutional 
grounds.23  The only real authority for a claim of constitutional right to inspect 
witnesses’ statements in the government’s possession is contained in a case 
cited in one of the footnotes to the Jencks opinion.24  And this case is 
 
 23. The Jencks case apparently overrules Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), 
which held that if a witness does not use his notes or memoranda in court, a party has no absolute 
right to inspect them.  Since the Goldman case was decided in 1942, it is difficult to conceive—if 
the fundamental issue is constitutional—that the court could within the space of 15 years reach 
two results so much at variance without once discussing the constitutional ground. 
 24. United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952), cited by Jencks 
majority in footnote 13.  After examining the witnesses’ prior statements in camera, the judge 
granted disclosure, saying: at 736: “. . . if material to a degree not clearly de minimis, both reason 
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significantly employed by the Jencks majority only for the broad proposition 
that “justice shall be done,” rather than for any point of constitutional weight. 
But while the court did not resort to the language of the Constitution, it did 
make some suggestion of a fundamental question involved in the Jencks 
issue.25  Based on that vague suggestion, certain assumptions of constitutional 
right have been made by commentators.  But there has been some 
disagreement even among these commentators.  For example, Congressional 
committees, working with proposed bills26 to limit the scope of the case and 
restore judicial discretion on the question of the production for inspection, 
have entertained the fear that they were treading on Fifth Amendment grounds 
invulnerable to their legislative powers.27  Senator Thomas C. Hennings of 
Missouri, considered an authority on constitutional matters, has stated that the 
Jencks case upholds the Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation clause.28  
On the other hand, counsel for Jencks, while citing the Sixth Amendment in 
their argument to the Supreme Court, apparently relied29  on the compulsory 
process clause: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .” 
The interest of the state prosecutor in the decision is the possibility that the 
Jencks holding—however amorphous its meaning now—will in time assume 
the substance of a constitutional right applicable to the states, or that state 
courts will find its rationale of such persuasive force as to encourage state 
compliance.  As a practical matter, it is conceivable that defense lawyers in 
state courts will press their earliest opportunity for a look at the prosecutor’s 
files.  This means that the issues of constitutionality and desirability posed by 
the Jencks case must be met and solved by the states in the near future. 
 
and policy advocate that the defense should be entitled to compel production of the evidence in 
fulfillment of the assurance of the Sixth Amendment.” 
 25. “Requiring the accused first to show conflict between the reports and the testimony is 
actually to deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his defense.” 353 U.S. at 667.  
“Because only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use for purpose of 
discrediting the Government’s witness and thereby furthering the accused’s defense, the defense 
must initially be entitled to see them to determine what use may be made of them.  Justice 
requires no less.”  Id. at 668. 
 26. S. 2377, H.R. 7915, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
 27. Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) p. 2: 
“The proposed legislation, as reported, is not designed to nullify, or to curb, or to limit the 
decision of the Supreme Court insofar as due process is concerned.” 
 28. Quoted in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 8, 1957.  Reprinted in 13 J. Mo. B. 164.  The 
decision in the Jencks case “apparently finds its rationale in the time-honored Sixth Amendment 
right of an accused ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” 
 29. Brief for petitioner, United States v. Jencks, p. 5. 
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The Constitutional Issue 
It is the author’s thesis that the Jencks case, and all of its logical 
extensions, cannot be a constitutional mandate to the states.  Even if we 
assume that the constitutional interpretations of Jencks mentioned above do in 
time come to be accepted, still the state process would not be affected.  For it is 
well settled that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are not embodied as such 
in the Fourteenth Amendment and applied against the states.30  If Jencks is 
truly supported by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, that does not 
automatically make it a rule applicable to the states.31  The due process clause 
of the Fourteenth is protection only against such state action as violates the 
“immutable principles of justice,”32  or those which are “of the very essence of 
a scheme of ordered liberty.”33 
As Edward S. Corwin tells us: “While in a general way (the due process) 
clause imposes on the powers of the state the same kinds of limitations that the 
corresponding clause of Amendment V does on the powers of the National 
Government, there is this conspicuous difference, that it does not subject state 
criminal procedure to the detailed requirements which the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments lay upon the National Government.  For this reason, the states 
remain free to remodel their procedural practices, so long as they retain the 
essence of ‘due process of law,’ that is, a fair trial in a court having jurisdiction 
of the case.”34 
In the last analysis, the constitutional importance of Jencks for the state 
prosecutor will be found in an answer to the question of whether or not the 
denial of disclosure for impeachment undermines the fairness of a trial.  To my 
knowledge there are no state or federal authorities which have answered this 
question in definitive terms.  But the courts have dealt with related issues 
which may shed light on the issue raised. 
The right to counsel, protected by the Sixth Amendment against the 
national government, is not a right of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in every case.35  Requests for compulsory process can be denied 
by a state within the bounds of due process if the requests are untimely made.36  
In absence of a statute, the accused in a criminal case is not entitled to have his 
 
 30. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
 31. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 32. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898). 
 33. Justice Cardozo’s formulation in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 34. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 247 (1954). 
 35. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 36. Commonwealth ex rel. Jennings v. Maroney, 179 Pa. Super.  571, 118 A.2d 287 (1955). 
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witnesses summoned at public expense as part of the constitutional right to 
compulsory process.37 
Most state courts have held that it is not a violation of the Fourteenth’s due 
process to deny a defendant the right to see his own confession prior to its 
admission at trial, unless prejudice can be shown by this denial.38  And the 
Supreme Court has endorsed this conclusion.39  Nor is the denial by a state of 
the discovery processes provided by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.40  The Illinois courts tell 
us there is no inherent right in a defendant to require information which he 
believes may possibly be in the personal files of the state’s attorney.41 
Recantation of testimony by a witness against an accused is not in itself a 
ground for invoking the due process clause.42  Surely it would be anomalous to 
say that a defendant has no absolute right to a new trial when a witness claims 
that he has perjured himself, and yet say that when there is no evidence of any 
conflict in the witness’s story the defendant has a constitutional right to look at 
his prior statement on the mere possibility of finding something impeaching. 
On the other hand, a defense motion to subpoena the Grand Jury reporter 
and his notes to show that a trial witness gave contradictory testimony before 
the jury must be granted under the constitutional right of compulsory process, 
according to a Florida court.43  Note that in this case the materiality of the 
evidence was admitted and the defendant had made an offer of proof with his 
subpoena.  In an earlier case in Florida, the court held it would violate state 
constitutional rights of compulsory process to deny the defendant the 
opportunity of using the Grand Jury reporter and his records to impeach.44  The 
court expressly said, however, that the case did not involve documents in the 
possession of the prosecuting attorney.  And in a case where the defendant 
attempted to obtain transcripts of statements of state witnesses held by the 
prosecution, the Florida court has rejected a claim that due process required the 
production of these documents.45 
Looking closely at the holdings in these related cases, it would seem that 
while due process might be violated by the failure of a state to produce for the 
 
 37. State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 264 P.2d 419 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 962 (1953). 
 38. Application of Tune, 230 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 987 (1956).  
For state reports see, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953) (Justice Brennan, sitting on the New Jersey 
bench at the time, is author of the dissent), and 17 N.J. 100, 110 A.2d 99 (1954). 
 39. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). 
 40. People v. Kross, 112 Cal. App. 2d 602, 247 P.2d 44 (1952). 
 41. People v. Murphy, 412 Ill. 458, 107 N.E.2d 748 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 899 
(1952). 
 42. Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 109 A.2d 96 (1954). 
 43. Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957). 
 44. State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936). 
 45. McAden v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 21 So. 2d 33 (1945), cert denied, 326 U.S. 723 (1945). 
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defendant prior statements which have been shown to be contradictory, there is 
no support for the proposition that such statements must be produced absent 
such showing. 
In summary, the Jencks opinion does not in and of itself apply to state 
courts.  Even if it is a constitutional pronouncement, which is doubtful, the rule 
would get its vitality from constitutional provisions only applicable to the 
federal government.  The need for disclosure on the part of a defendant would 
not constitute the type of basic right assured to the individual against the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Should the Jencks Rationale Prevail in The States? 
However, even if we grant that Jencks has no constitutional relevance for 
the states, the significance of the case still cannot be blinked away by state 
prosecutors.  The fact remains that seven of the eight Supreme Court justices 
who decided the case agreed that it is justice for the defendant to have access 
to prior statements of government witnesses if these statements are relevant to 
a complete defense.  The concurring opinion disagrees only with the method of 
determining relevancy and materiality of the documents, not in the necessity of 
doing so.46  Surely there is great persuasive force in the near unanimity of the 
Court on this point.  Furthermore, the state prosecutor is still confronted with 
the statement of Justice Clark, the one member of the Court who opposed the 
type of disclosure authorized by the Jencks majority.  In his dissent, the Justice 
claimed that on the federal level the decision would have the effect of 
completely frustrating government intelligence agencies, but he added: “This 
may well be a reasonable rule in state prosecutions where none of the problems 
of foreign relations, espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, counterfeiting, 
internal security, national defense, and the like exist. . . .”47  (Just how the 
Justice reached this conclusion, even though it is dictum only, is somewhat of a 
mystery.  There are still some rather substantial problems on the state level 
which would be affected by the Jencks rule—narcotics, and gambling 
syndicates, to mention but two.  The scope of police intelligence squads may 
be more restricted than their federal counterparts, but one can hardly conclude 
that their work is less deserving of every legitimate protection.) 
 
 46. In the concurring opinion, 353 U.S. at 674, Justice Burton writes: “A rule requiring a 
showing of contradiction in every case would not serve the ends of justice.  I concur, therefore, in 
that portion of the Court’s opinion holding that petitioner laid a sufficient foundation for the 
production of the reports.  I would not, however, replace the inflexible and narrow rule adopted 
by the courts below with the broader, but equally rigid rule announced by the Court.  In matters 
relating to the production of evidence or the scope of cross-examination, a large discretion must 
be allowed the trial judge.” 
 47. 353 U.S. at 682. 
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In short, once the constitutional issue is put aside, we are only at the 
threshold of an argument in the states over the merits and demerits of full and 
free disclosure.  Using Missouri as an example, I propose to show the various 
forms which the problem of the Jencks rationale may take, and to comment 
briefly on them.  To do that intelligibly, we must first look at Missouri law on 
the subject. 
Missouri’s Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for discovery and 
inspection in criminal cases;48 neither do they answer the Jencks issue of 
disclosure of possible impeaching statements at trial.  But Rule 25.1949  does 
have as its object the production “of documents or objects at the trial that 
contain evidence material and relevant to the issues and to require prior 
production and inspection of such records or objects if prior production and 
inspection will expedite the trial.”50 
No case in Missouri has squarely met the question of whether statements 
and reports of witnesses, held by the prosecution, must be produced to 
defendants for possible impeachment at trial after the witness has testified.  
This is in itself significant, for it means that defense attorneys, in the absence 
of the statute, have never seriously argued that they have a right to such 
statements, absent any showing of contradiction between the trial testimony 
and the previous statement. 
In the leading case of a quasi-Jencks nature in Missouri, involving a pre-
trial demand, the Supreme Court of state denied the right of inspection by 
defendant of written statements made by witnesses already endorsed for trial.51  
The claim of defendant in this case was bottomed on a statute52  giving the 
court discretion to order production of any papers “containing evidence 
relating to the merits of the action.” 
The court said, in rejecting the defense motion, 
No reason is assigned why these statements should be produced, and no facts 
are alleged which tend to show that the statements contain evidence material to 
the defense of the party asking for their production.  Besides, the written 
statements of these witnesses would be hearsay, and therefore not admissible 
in evidence except by way of impeachment in event the witness testified to a 
state of facts different from those contained in the written statement made by 
him.  The statute does not authorize the court to order the production of papers 
 
 48. State ex rel. Phelps v. McQueen, 296 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1956). 
 49. MO. REV. STAT.  (1955 Cum. Supp. p. 1097). 
 50. See note 48 supra. 
 51. State ex rel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 25 S.W.2d 459 (1930). 
 52. MO. REV. STAT. § 1378 (1919), which is substantially the same as its successor MO. 
REV. STAT. § 510.030 (1949), applying to civil procedure. 
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in the absence of a showing that they contain evidence material to the issues in 
the pending case.53 
And the court expressly pointed out that the mere possibility of 
impeachment would not sustain a pre-trial motion under the statute. 
This is still the law in Missouri, and pre-trial inspections based on the 
unsubstantiated hope of turning up impeaching statements are denied.54  The 
same reasoning has prevailed in rejecting pre-trial motions to inspect Grand 
Jury minutes for possible impeachment evidence.55 
In regard to motions made at trial for documents held by the prosecution, 
Missouri has denied the defendant access to his own signed statements not 
introduced at trial,56  his transcribed answers given to prosecution questions,57  
and wire-recorded conversations between him and law-enforcement officers.58  
In the first two of these cases, defendant obviously wanted the documents 
recording his own statements to undermine and impeach testimony relating to 
what those statements were. 
In other words, Missouri has refused pre-trial inspection of statements that 
might impeach because there has been no proof of relevancy and materiality.  
These pre-trial motions have usually been based on statutes, but the rationale 
which denies the request would apply to at-trial motions also—unless by 
showing contradiction the defendant proves the materiality of the documents.  
Missouri has also denied at-trial inspection of statements made by defendant 
himself, where defendant seeks to impeach witnesses testifying to the very 
matter contained in the statement, or where the effort is to establish some fact 
favorable to defendant’s position. 
None of these situations are on all fours with the situation with Jencks: a 
motion at trial to produce prior statements made by adverse witnesses who 
have testified.  But the import of Missouri law seems contra to any such 
production.  If the witness cannot have documents which record his own 
statements (the contents of which he presumably remembers) to impeach an 
adverse witnesses’ version of them, why should he be allowed to have 
statements of adverse witnesses on the mere hope that they may be in conflict 
with trial testimony?59 
 
 53. 324 Mo. at 932, 25 S.W.2d at 462. 
 54. State v. Brown, 360 Mo. 104, 227 S.W.2d 646 (1950); State v. Richette, 342 Mo. 1015, 
119 S.W.2d 330 (1938). 
 55. State v. McDonald, 342 Mo. 998, 119 S.W.2d 286 (1938). 
 56. State v. Hancock, 340 Mo. 918, 104 S.W.2d 241 (1937). 
 57. State v. Kelton, 229 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1957). 
 58. State v. Lawson, 360 Mo. 95, 227 S.W.2d 642 (1950). 
 59. It should be pointed out that the defendant is protected against any deliberate use of 
perjured evidence or knowing suppression of evidence by state prosecutors.  Such actions by a 
state prosecutor violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 
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An Assumption of Change in State Law 
In the face of what appears to be the Missouri sentiment on this question, 
let us now suppose that the state decides to overrule its previous cases and their 
clear tendency to deny a Jencks-type disclosure.  Any change should, of 
course, come initially from the Supreme Court of Missouri; a trial judge would 
hardly be justified in overruling all the analogous Missouri precedents on the 
question.  Our supposition is that the Supreme Court of the state becomes 
persuaded that as a matter of procedural fairness in criminal prosecutions, it 
should follow the example of the Jencks decision and allow inspection of prior 
statements made by prosecution witnesses without any showing of 
contradiction with trial testimony.60 
To what matters would or should such a state ruling apply?  How would 
that affect criminal prosecutions, taking St. Louis as an example? 
There are various documents, different in purpose and form, which could 
theoretically come under a Jencks-type rule.  In analyzing them, we should 
remember the purpose of that rule: the use for impeachment of statements 
handed over at the time the witness is testifying. 
Among the items that might be found in the prosecutor’s file in any given 
case are: 
Transcripts of Coroner’s Inquest.  No need exists for any new rule here, as 
the defense now has available to it these records. 
Grand Jury Testimony.  The answers given by prospective witnesses in the 
Grand Jury room are transcribed verbatim by a reporter, and represent 
responses to questions put by an assistant circuit attorney, or less frequently, a 
member of the jury itself.  The fact of stenographic transcription fairly well 
assures the accuracy of the documents, but a major obstacle to any rule to 
produce is the public policy against divulgence of Grand Jury testimony 
unnecessarily.  Under the statute,61  the defense can produce a juror himself to 
testify at the trial concerning the consistency of witnesses’ statements, and 
this—rather than the production of the minutes of the jury—has been held to 
be the proper way to impeach such a situation.62 
Warrant Office Statements.  Before an information is issued, the assistant 
circuit attorney will have interviewed the complainant and other witnesses, and 
 
F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
 60. The State court would not be following the Jencks decision as a rule of law binding 
them, for such is not the case.  The hypothetical posed here is that the court is convinced of the 
desirability of the rule, not of its legal necessity under the Federal Constitution. 
 61. MO. REV. STAT. § 540.300 (1949). 
 62. State v. Thomas, 99 Mo. 235, 12 S.W. 643 (1889).  Since MO. REV. STAT. § 540.105 
(1955 Cum. Supp.) now provides for an official reporter, there may be less reason to deny the 
minutes to defendant as possible impeachment material. 
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questioned them closely on various aspects of the alleged crime.  Very often 
this exchange is transcribed by a stenographer.63  Clearly, if a Jencks-type rule 
is imminent in Missouri, this variety of statement is the most likely to be 
affected.  There is no danger here that the answers of the witness will be 
garbled by another’s attempt at summary, since the questions and answers are 
put in the record exactly as they occurred. 
Statements to Investigators.  A group of special investigators work out of 
the Circuit Attorney’s office.  Sometimes they obtain statements from potential 
witnesses which are written by the declarant, or signed and adopted by him.  
These are obviously as reliable as the warrant office statements mentioned 
above, because the person who makes them deliberately approves the version 
recorded by the investigator.  However, these investigators also talk to 
witnesses and then make a summary of that conversation which the potential 
witness never sees.  These are inexact and unreliable when considered for the 
purposes of impeachment. 
Police Reports.  These take a variety of forms.  One or more officers may 
investigate each case and write up their notes in a rough form.  These notes are 
then worked over by a clerk-typist whose job is to synthesize, summarize and 
shape the information into a running account of the case.  Sometimes the clerk 
will editorialize, nearly always he will be required to blend the various reports 
into a continuous running narrative. 
Another type of police report involves a verbal recitation of the 
investigating officer’s findings to his commanding officer who, in turn, will 
write the report and send it to the Chief of Police. 
Still another police report may consist of a single officer’s written 
statement incorporating quotations from a witness. 
Any attempt to require production of police reports for impeachment of an 
officer on the witness stand would lack justification.  In most instances, as 
pointed out above, the officer has in fact not been the party who put the facts of 
his report in final form.  Either his superior or a clerk-typist has intervened 
between the officer’s version and the report which finally emerges as official.  
Would it not be incongruous to bind a policeman to the hearsay summary of a 
clerk? 
If the police report is used to impeach the person originally interviewed by 
the officer, many of the same objections occur.  For the report normally is not 
the work of the policeman who talked to the potential witness.  The Jencks rule 
applied in this situation would mean that a witness would be confronted with a 
statement allegedly made by him, as reported by a clerk who heard it from an 
officer who was only one of a group making reports on the same incident. 
 
 63. This is not true for many prosecution offices outside the city of St. Louis.  It should also 
be pointed out that the Circuit Attorney of St. Louis is only responsible for the prosecution of 
felonies, not of misdemeanors. 
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Prosecutor’s Summaries.  Normally, the prosecution’s files will include 
comments made by an assistant circuit attorney as to what the witnesses will 
testify, based upon his interviews with them.  Certainly no one would contend 
that this work product of the prosecutor could have any proper value to 
impeach a witness. 
As a prosecutor, then, my personal reaction to a Jencks rule in the states 
would be this: It would be unwise and unnecessary for state courts to order 
pre-trial disclosure of statements designed for impeachment.  It would certainly 
be disastrous if the whole file of the prosecutor should be opened for what is 
called a “fishing expedition.”  Such a rule would also lack any justification in 
the case of police reports which represent boiled down hearsay statements of a 
clerk. 
Whether warrant office statements of prosecution witnesses should be 
turned over to the defense at trial is a more arguable question.  At least the 
defendant can say of such statements that they are probably accurately 
recorded, and that the memory of the potential witness should have been better 
at the time of the statement since he was closer then to the underlying incident.  
But what the defendant cannot say about any of these statements is that they 
are probably relevant, or that he has a need for them.  In effect, defendant is 
blindly throwing out his line to see if he can hook any information that might 
be helpful to him.  The state courts will have to decide if our judicial process 
really requires that defendants be allowed this fisherman’s cast. 
CONCLUSION 
While Jencks is not a constitutional mandate to the states, and while 
Missouri by all the evidence does not endorse its rationale, there may be an 
argument brewing for state prosecutors over whether the defendants should not 
be allowed to look at witnesses’ statements in the files.  If it comes, the 
argument should be restricted to the type of reports where the previous 
statements have been carefully recorded and the witness has, through conduct 
or signature, approved their contents.  In my opinion, a warrant office 
statement would qualify for serious consideration under this criterion, but a 
police report would not. 
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